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Abstract 
Existing literature has offered a variety of claims regarding why financial regulatory 
politics features a relative dominance of the regulated financial industry. In this article 
we explore the broader interest group environment in which financial industry 
advocacy operates. Using new data on interest group participation in financial 
regulatory consultations, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of the ecology 
of interest groups that populate financial regulatory policymaking. Through a new 
measure of ‘mobilized dissent’ we find evidence that the level of interest group 
pluralism in financial regulatory policymaking is constrained by the limited 
mobilization of voices outside of the business community. We analyze how mobilized 
dissent toward the regulated financial industry changes in response to different 
institutional environments. While technical complexity, institutional context, and the 
global financial crisis are found to impact the level of mobilized dissent, the impact of 
these environmental conditions varies across different groups. This analysis reveals 
not only that organized opposition to the financial industry is relatively weak but also 
that it is relatively disjointed. 
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The global financial crisis has triggered an explosion of scholarly and journalistic articles 
about the political economy of finance and financial regulation. This scholarship is extensive and 
diverse. Yet within much of this literature, the specter of interest groups looms large. Many analyses 
of the design and implementation of financial regulatory policies in particular have focused on the 
wide array of resources that financial industry groups deploy in attempt to shape public policies, 
such as the significant lobbying war chests (Johnson & Kwak, 2010; Hacker & Pierson, 2010), their 
informal social ties to their regulators (Seabrooke & Tsingou, 2009), and the structural power that 
financial industry groups exercise in contemporary capitalist economies (cf Stephen Bell & 
Hindmoor, 2014).  
The financial industry however does not operate in a vacuum. A key dimension of the 
politics of financial regulation is the broader interest group environment in which financial industry 
advocacy operates. Existing literature on financial industry power emphasizes not only the 
resources that the financial industry can deploy to shape the content of regulatory policies but also 
the fact that it frequently finds itself relatively uncontested. Many have lamented in this context 
how the involvement of civil society organizations has been sporadic and weak when it comes to 
financial regulation (Scholte, 2013; Helleiner & Porter, 2010; Mügge, 2010, p. 9; Mooslechner, 
Schuberth, & Weber, 2006), and the lack of countervailing forces has reinforced the “unchecked 
might of global finance” (Anheier, 2014). Such depictions of the financial regulatory policymaking 
environment has not remained uncontested, as a variety of case studies have highlighted how 
financial industry groups have been facing opposition from outside as well as within the financial 
industry since the crisis (Kastner, 2014; Clapp & Helleiner, 2012; Pagliari & Young, 2014; Young, 
2012; Helleiner & Thistlethwaite, 2013). These and other observations have called into question 
what McKeen-Edwards and Porter (2013) call the “unified dominance model” of financial 
regulatory politics.   
At the heart of this discussion is an empirical issue related to a classical dimension of the 
study of the policy making process: the question of how diverse or pluralistic is the interest group 
environment within a given policy area. To what extent is financial regulatory policymaking 
characterized by interest group pluralism, whereby different groups act as countervailing voices 
against the preferences of the regulated financial industry? To what extent does the regulated 
financial industry simply dominate the regulatory policymaking process, and crowd out other, 
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potentially dissenting, voices? What factors might affect the amount of dissent faced by the 
regulated financial industry? Answering these questions is critical if we are to understand the 
financial industry dominance of the policymaking process and the conditions under which this is 
contested.  
This paper makes a contribution to the literature on the political economy of financial 
regulation by examining the variable levels of interest group pluralism in financial regulatory politics 
and assessing which conditions affect this plurality. While financial regulatory politics is an 
expansive terrain and involves a wide variety of relationships between the industry and government 
institutions, our analysis focuses specifically on financial regulatory policies developed by 
specialized regulatory agencies, and the interest group advocacy that organize their policymaking 
activity.  
Three aspects of our approach differentiate us from existing studies. First, most studies of 
interest groups in financial regulation have focused on specific policies, institutions or actors 
through in-depth qualitative case studies (Lall, 2012; Quaglia, 2008; Woll, 2013; Mügge, 2006), thus 
making a general overview of this terrain difficult to ascertain. While this qualitative literature has 
greatly informed the hypotheses we test, our analysis complements existing scholarship through a 
quantitative analysis aimed at observing general but context-varying trends in the participation of 
interest groups in financial regulatory politics (see also Young and Pagliari 2015). Using new data 
from financial regulatory consultations from 1999 to 2013 we develop a broad survey of which 
groups are mobilizing during financial regulatory policymaking in this arena.  
Second, our analysis takes strong cues from existing ‘population ecology’ approaches to the 
study of interest groups. The basic premise of the population ecology literature is that the 
mobilization of interest groups over a given issue or in a given jurisdictional space is not simply the 
result of the individual incentives and resources of each group, but is often conditioned by the 
environments in which interest groups find themselves (Gray & Lowery, 1996, p. 40).
2
 Along the 
same lines, a few analyses of the political economy of financial markets since the financial crisis 
have stressed the need for a broader view of how financial industry actors are embedded in 
complex interdependent relationships with a range of different actors, much like relationships in an 
                                                     
2
 While ecologically-derived theories of interest group activity exist (such as the ‘energy stability area’ model), 
we do not seek to test these here (Gray & Lowery, 1996; Messer, Berkhout, & Lowery, 2011). 
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ecosystem.
3
 As a result, rather than zooming in on the resources and characteristics of individual 
groups, we are interested in understanding, using real-world observational data, how interest group 
populations change in response to different environmental conditions.  
Third, unlike existing population ecology literature, our approach seeks to understand how 
interest groups relate to one another across these varied environments. In order to assess ‘interest 
group plurality’ in financial regulatory policymaking, we need to investigate not only which groups 
mobilize, but also how different groups (if and when they are present) express preferences that are 
aligned or in conflict with the financial industry targeted for regulation. Because of the particular 
methods that we deploy in this analysis, our focus is on the traceable efforts of interest groups as 
they mobilize in the policymaking process.
4
 We focus herein on arenas of regulatory policymaking 
in which the literature has found extensive formal involvement of interest groups in policy 
formulation and involvement, in the US, EU and within transnational regulatory bodies.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 reviews the existing literature on interest 
group plurality in financial regulatory politics and discusses the ‘environmental conditions’ that are 
understood to constrain the opposition faced by the financial industry in this domain. Section 2 
then describes our data, which allows us to assess both which kinds of interest groups mobilize and 
what these groups’ preferences are – two factors that we synthesize to produce a new indicator of 
interest group plurality, ‘mobilized dissent’. Section 3 then conducts a series of empirical tests of 
how mobilized dissent varies across a range of different environmental conditions specified within 
the literature.  
Our analysis leads us to several conclusions about the broader interest group ecology 
within which the financial industry operates. First, depictions of financial regulatory politics as 
                                                     
3
 For instance, Seabrooke and Tsingou (2009, 2014) draw on Abbott’s (2005) notion of ‘linked ecologies’ to 
think through the professional connections within finance – shedding new light on ‘old’ dynamics, like 
‘revolving doors’. Holmes (2009) also uses the language of a financial ecosystem to describe the relationship 
between the financial industry and the broader economy. Haldane and May (2011) conceptualize to ‘banking 
ecosystems’ in a similar relational frame. 
4
 It might be argued that the mobilization of interest groups within the financial regulatory consultation 
process is only secondary to other factors that ex ante shape the regulatory agenda in favor of the financial 
industry, such as dominant norms or the structural power of the financial industry. While we acknowledge 
that we can only observe mobilized responses to regulatory policies that are already on the agenda, it is widely 
acknowledged within the literature that interest group plurality space plays an important role in influencing 
the design and implementation of regulatory policies (Halpin & Grant, 2012) and in constraining financial 
industry influence (Kastner, 2014; Woll, 2013; Pagliari & Young, 2014). Even recent interventions on the 
‘structural power’ of the financial industry suggest that industry’s mobilization efforts can be seen in a 
complementary way to their prominence and agenda-setting powers (Culpepper & Reinke, 2014; S Bell & 
Hindmoor, 2014). 
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dominated by business are broadly supported in our empirical evidence. Non-business civil society 
groups certainly express divergent preferences toward the regulated financial industry; however 
their infrequent mobilization means that they seldom represent a significant share of mobilized 
dissent. The broader business community, outside the regulated financial industry, has strongly 
concordant preferences with the financial industry; yet because business groups represents the most 
frequent voices in the policymaking process, conflict within the business community serves as the 
most common source of interest group pluralism. Second, while interest group plurality may be low 
it is also highly variable. After examining the conditions under which mobilized dissent changes we 
find that hypothesized conditions such as the level of technical complexity, institutional context, 
and the global financial crisis are found to impact the level of mobilized dissent, the impact of these 
environmental conditions varies across different groups. These ‘differentiated reaction norms’ of 
interest groups highlight not only that organized opposition to the financial industry is relatively 
weak but also that it is relatively disjointed. As we discuss in the conclusion, the effectiveness of 
interest group pluralism in balancing the position of the financial industry is kept in check by the 
disjointedness of its opposition.  
 
Section 1: Interest Group Plurality and Financial Regulation 
Within the broad literature on the political economy of financial regulation, a large body of 
work has investigated the variety of structural, discursive and instrumental variants of power that 
different groups deploy in an attempt to influence the design of financial regulatory policies, as well 
as the numerous formal and informal channels of access through which these groups are capable to 
participate to policymaking process (Johnson & Kwak, 2010; Young, 2012; Sennholz-Weinhardt, 
2014; Woll, 2013; Baker, 2010; Tsingou, 2014). Mechanisms to incorporate the voices of different 
groups in the design of regulatory policies have been institutionalized, such as the practice of 
seeking comments on exposure drafts of policies and inviting groups to testify in legislative 
hearings as a way of soliciting feedback on regulatory policies. 
This literature has argued that it is not only the composition of interest groups in the 
policymaking process that matters in shaping policy outcomes, but also the diversity of their voices. 
The absence of interest group plurality has been presented as conducive to the development of 
regulatory policy outcomes that favor “the narrow few” (for a review see Mattli & Woods, 2009; 
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Kroszner & Strahan, 2000), an outcome frequently associated with “regulatory capture” (Stigler, 
1971; Carpenter & Moss, 2013). In contrast, the presence of interest group plurality is understood 
to reduce the risks that policymakers find themselves exposed to one-sided evidence from the 
industry being targeted for regulation (Carpenter & Moss, 2013), and to mitigate against the risk of 
groupthink and intellectual capture (Kwak, 2013).  
From this perspective, an overwhelming consensus within the literature on the politics of 
financial regulation seems to be that the landscape of interest groups engaged in this policy domain 
is one where – as Baker puts it - the “plurality of active participation is severely restricted” (Baker 
2009). In particular, while powerful organized interests within the financial industry are often 
characterized as securing disproportionate access to high-level policymakers, other stakeholders 
such as smaller financial institutions, non-financial corporations, and diffuse interests such as 
deposit holders, small investors and taxpayers are often perceived as excluded from the 
policymaking process (Lall, 2012; Underhill & Zhang, 2008; Johnson & Kwak, 2010). As a result, 
several policy proposals designed to improve financial regulation have focused on enhancing the 
plurality of interest groups involved in the design of regulatory policies in an attempt to add 
countervailing voices to the dominance of the financial industry and restore balance to the process 
(Morgan, 2011, p. 595; Baxter, 2011; Pagliari, 2012).  
Existing literature suggests four main ‘environmental conditions’ constraining the degree of 
interest group plurality in the financial regulatory policymaking. The first of these conditions is the 
technical complexity of financial regulatory policies. In particular, the complexity of an issue area is 
understood to create substantial ‘information asymmetries’ between different interest groups – in 
particular between the regulated industry and other stakeholders – and therefore to increase the 
mobilization costs for those groups lacking technical expertise (Broscheid & Coen, 2007; 
Rasmussen & Carroll, 2013). In the case of financial regulation, the increasingly information-
intensive and complex nature of this area makes the distribution of technical expertise between 
different stakeholders “heavily asymmetric” (Lall, 2015, p. 128). The level of expertise required to 
contribute to most financial regulatory issues is seen to hinder the participation of those 
stakeholders outside of the financial industry that lack significant technical expertise to be able to 
monitor the regulatory process and develop a position (Baker, 2010; Heinemann & Schüler, 2002; 
Scholte, 2013).  
 7 
  A second environmental condition seen as constraining interest group pluralism in the 
financial regulatory policymaking process is the degree of salience. The salience of any given policy 
domain can be defined as the importance that the general public will assign to a specific issue 
compared to other issues on the political agenda (Wlezien, 2005). Based on this definition, financial 
regulatory policymaking has been identified in most scholarly accounts as usually a very low 
salience area (Woll, 2013).  Thus a situation of “quiet politics” (Culpepper, 2011; Gormley, 1986) is 
understood to constrain the capacity of groups beyond the financial industry to mobilize in 
response to different financial regulatory proposals (Baker, 2010; Scholte, 2013). As Baker has 
argued, during normal times, “the wider public has little interest in financial regulation—the 
distributional consequences remain highly technical, and therefore unclear to the general public”, 
while financial industry groups “find themselves relatively unopposed because countervailing 
societal interests are largely absent” (Baker, 2010, p. 652).  
Importantly, salience is an environmental condition that can change. Policy domains which 
usually remain outside of the spotlight can rise to one of the main priorities on general public’s 
agenda as a result of events such as crises. Mattli and Woods have argued that crises may favor the 
mobilization of societal actors besides the targeted actors by producing a ‘demonstration effect’ and 
reveal the distributional implications of regulatory policies and opening new channels of access to 
the regulatory process (Mattli & Woods, 2009). The recent global financial crisis clearly changed the 
salience of financial regulation, increasing the level of media coverage of the media around financial 
regulatory policies and affecting the ways that both everyday citizens and organized interest groups 
dealt with financial regulatory issues (Thirkell-Whitle, 2009; Woll, 2013; Kastner, 2014). However, 
the impact of a crisis in increasing the level of salience of financial regulatory policymaking is not 
permanent but it is likely to wax and wane in accordance with the “issue attention cycle” whereas 
issues that leaps into prominence inevitably fades from the center of the public attention (Downs, 
1972; Knecht & Weatherford, 2006, p. 710).  
Third, the institutional context within which financial regulatory policies are designed may 
also constrain interest group plurality. In particular a key trend that has characterized much 
financial regulatory policymaking over the last few decades is the emergence of transgovernmental 
networks of regulators such as the Basel Committee and the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions where independent regulatory authorities coordinate their policies with 
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their foreign counterparts (Slaughter, 2004). Such a shift in the financial regulatory policymaking 
from the national to the transnational level is understood to put pressure on the organizational 
resources required to mobilize, thus making regulatory policymaking less plural at the transnational 
level (Kahler & Lake, 2003; Mattli & Woods, 2009).  
A fourth aspect of the institutional environment that is expected to affect interest group 
pluralism in financial regulatory politics is the stage of the policymaking process. Because financial 
industry ‘insiders’ are understood to exploit their informational advantages and their network of 
personal connections with financial regulators, their early mobilization crowds out other kinds of 
stakeholders (Lall, 2012). This “first mover advantage” however decreases during later stages of the 
policymaking process as more information regarding the impact of different regulatory proposals 
become available to other stakeholders.  On the other hand, other authors have suggested that 
when the design of regulatory policies is characterized by a high degree of salience, market insiders 
will have an incentive to concentrate their lobbying efforts on the less transparent and more 
technical implementation phase during which they are likely to face less opposition from other 
groups (Culpepper, 2011; Pagliari & Young, 2013). 
In summary, existing literature has suggested that the financial regulatory policymaking 
landscape is dominated by financial industry voices. Different environmental conditions such as the 
level of technical complexity, issue salience, the governance level and stage of policymaking are all 
understood to affect the extent to which financial regulation is dominated by the regulated financial 
industry or facing the dissent from other interest groups mobilizing. These conditions are however 
not fixed: the interest group environment in financial regulatory policymaking may be dynamic and 
changing.  For instance, different empirical studies have documented how the regulated financial 
industry has occasionally been constrained by the opposition faced different groups – for example 
by NGOs and other non-business groups (Clapp & Helleiner, 2012; Kastner, 2014), as well as other 
business groups inside and outside the financial industry (Mügge, 2006; Young, 2012; Pagliari & 
Young, 2014).   
While much theorization of each of the environmental conditions described above exists, 
and while some qualitative scholarship has explored them in single case studies, we are not aware of 
any empirical tests which systematically assess the level of interest group plurality in financial 
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regulatory politics and how this changes in response to different environmental conditions. In what 
follows below, we develop an empirical strategy that can help to address this lacuna in the literature.  
 
Section 2 – Empirical Data on Interest Group Plurality  
In this section we seek to account for the claim concerning the limited interest group 
plurality in financial regulatory politics advanced by the political economy literature discussed 
above. We do so with attention to two dimensions of interest group pluralism: what groups speak 
up, and what they say. The first we call mobilization; the second we call preferences.  
In order to assess the mobilization and preferences of interest groups which become active 
around different financial regulatory issues, we generated a dataset composed of comment letters 
submitted by interest groups in response to financial regulatory consultations. The kinds of interest 
groups that respond are highly varied but include business associations of all kinds, NGOs, labour 
unions, research institutes and consumer protection groups. Much industry lobbying is conducted 
by individual firms and thus like most extant literature we consider individual firms, as well as 
coalitions of firms, to be interest groups. 
 From the perspective of regulators, responses to such consultations provide important 
technical feedback as well as a much-needed source of information about private sector sentiment 
over policies and about the possible impact that the regulatory policy may have over different 
groups. Interest groups have a strong incentive to contribute to these policy consultations and to 
leave a record of their positions, because it leaves a marker which demonstrates to their members 
that they are actively working for a given advocacy cause, and communicates policymakers what 
their position is with respect to a given policy in development.
5
  
For our purposes, written comment letters serve as a useful indicator of interest group 
mobilization. Although such responses do not represent the only mechanism available for 
advocacy
6
 and do not allow us to weigh the relative importance of individual respondents, these 
                                                     
5
 In addition, some existing research suggests that such written responses constitute the most influential 
‘mode’ through which interest groups can influence the content of policy (see Godwin, Ainsworth, & Godwin, 
2012). While influence is not our immediate focus in this paper, we do consider this further compounding 
evidence for the quality of our data source. 
6
 Personal meetings with policymakers represent an alternative important channel through which interest 
groups seek to influence the content of regulatory policies. This is more empirically challenging to track for 
obvious reasons. However existing analyses of meetings between regulators and interest groups in the US 
reveal a similar lack of plurality to the one emerging from our analysis of letters to regulators (Drutman, 
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responses do nevertheless provide a relatively systematic ‘trace’ of what actors tend to mobilize in 
response to different regulatory policies as well as what their specific positions are. We 
acknowledge that one drawback of using mobilization data is that the underlying population of 
interest groups selecting themselves for mobilization is itself unknown.
7
 Some existing studies of 
interest group population dynamics utilize official lobbying registrars to analyze the existence of 
different kinds of interest groups – literally their birth and death (Gray & Lowery, 1996; Gray, 
Lowery, & Benz, 2013). However, following Rasmussen, Carroll and Lowery (2014), we are 
interested in the decisions and abilities of interest groups to become politically active on a given 
issue. Yet there is a wide precedent for using policy consultation data such as ours to trace the 
mobilization of interest groups in both qualitative studies of financial regulatory politics (Wood, 
2005; Young, 2012) as well within quantitative analyses of interest group activity more generally 
(Klüver 2009; Yackee and Yackee 2006; Mckay and Yackee 2007; Nixon, Howard, and DeWitt 
2002; Préfontaine, Desrochers, and Godbout 2010; Rasmussen and Carroll 2013; Rasmussen, 
Carroll, and Lowery 2014), although none of this to date has focused on financial regulation (for an 
exception, see Chalmers, 2015).  
We selected a wide diversity of consultations on financial regulatory policy taking place 
between 1999 to 2013, organized by the most important regulatory authorities in the United States, 
Europe and at the transnational level. The range of government agencies and specialized financial 
regulatory bodies from which our data are derived are outlined in the Appendix. Our analysis is 
centered specifically on the design and implementation of financial regulatory policies, and not the 
broader array of financial policies. Our criteria for selecting a regulatory policy consultation was 
relatively simple: each consultation had to propose a potential formal regulatory change in the 
financial sector and needed to give a relatively clear sense of which financial industries were being 
considered for regulation. In total we collected 11,866 comment letters in response to 250 different 
financial regulatory consultations.
8
 The range of regulated financial industries being regulated is 
substantial, as these consultations cover everything from banking regulation to hedge fund 
                                                                                                                                                           
2013). While informal and formal channels might coincide in the cases we examine here, this should not 
imply that they should coincide elsewhere. 
7
 The fact that our data is drawn from different institutional contexts makes this infeasible. Legal forms for 
interest group registration vary considerably across jurisdictions (see Martens, 2002), while at the 
transnational level, we cannot use registrars or directories where none exist. 
8
 Given the focus of our study on private sector mobilization, we have excluded those responses coming 
public actors, such as governments, regulatory agencies, or public international organizations, as well as 
individuals. 
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regulation to more specialized areas like consumer finance and credit rating agencies. The different 
regulated financial industries and their presence in our data are depicted in the Appendix. For each 
comment letter submitted to a regulatory consultation,
9
 we first coded the identity of the authoring 
group, differentiating respondents who were from business groups from those groups that we 
would consider non-business groups, such as NGOs, consumer protection organizations, labour 
unions, and research institutions such as specialized think tanks and universities.
10
   
Table 1 offers a simple breakdown our initial findings on the basis of the distribution of 
business to non-business respondents. Organized business clearly dominates, as non-business 
respondents, such as trade unions, consumer protection groups, research institutes and NGOs 
represents overall less than 6% of the responses received by policymakers around financial 
regulatory policies on aggregate. This supports the argument advanced by a number of scholars in 
the literature on the politics of financial regulation regarding the under-representation of non-
business societal actors in the financial regulatory policymaking (Scholte & Schnabel, 2002; Scholte, 
2013; Anheier, 2014) 
To make these figures more meaningful, we can calibrate our findings to existing studies.  
In a recent comprehensive review, Boehmke et al. remarked that “[m]ost major studies of 
representation in the interest group universe put the proportion of business interests anywhere 
from 50 percent to 80 percent, depending on how broadly those interests are construed” 
(Boehmke, Gailmard, & Patty, 2013, p. 28). Similar results have also presented by Golden (1998), 
three different studies listed in Baumgartner and Leech for the US context (Baumgartner & Leech, 
2001), and a recent study Rasmussen and Carroll which analyzes lobbying in the European Union 
(Rasmussen & Carroll, 2013). When we compare the results of these studies with ours (see Table 1), 
it appears that while business representation usually dominates, the under-representation of civil-
society relative to business voices is particularly strongly in the case of financial regulation. 
 
                                                     
9
 We were unable to classify 1.75% of the comment letters in our dataset, usually due to insufficient 
information concerning the groups’ name or other information in their comment letter. 
10
 We used an id variable to reduce the possibility that we engaged in double counting of the same actor 
mobilizing in the same consultation. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Business to Non-Business Groups in Existing Studies11 
 Golden 1998 Baumgartner 
and Leech 
2001 
Boehmke et 
al 2013 
Rasmussen 
and Carroll 
2013 
Financial 
Consultations 
Business 
88.83 80 82.9-84.4 
81 94.39 
 
Non-Business 11.17 20 13.6-21.4 18.7 5.60 
Of which Unions 0 2.33 1.40 2.8 0.87 
Of which NGOs 11.17 9.30 10.96 15.9 1.89 
Data Source Randomly 
selected US 
federal policy 
consultations 
across a variety 
of issue areas 
Pooled US 
federal lobbying 
registration data 
across a variety 
of issue areas  
Pooled US 
federal Lobbying 
registration data 
across a variety 
of issue areas 
Pooled policy 
consultations 
launched by 
the European 
Commission  
Policy consultations 
that target the financial 
industry specifically 
Total Sample 225 19,692 5,772 5,992 13,189 
 
 
While the studies summarized in Table 1 differentiate the business community from other 
kinds of interest groups, equally important is to differentiate the business community itself, given 
the potential for ‘business conflict’ in shaping the design of regulatory policies (Lindblom, 1977; 
Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & Lebon, 2009). In order to identify differences in the 
mobilization of business groups, we differentiated the business community along industry and 
sectoral lines. Specifically, we differentiated the regulated financial industry – i.e. those business 
actors who are the targets of the regulation in question and whose behavior is directly modified by 
the regulation (e.g. a bank in the case of a banking regulation) – from financial industries which are 
not the ‘targets’ of regulation (e.g. an insurance company in the context of a bank regulation), and 
business groups who are outside of the financial sector altogether (for a similar approach see 
Pagliari and Young 2014; Rasmussen and Carroll 2013).
12
  
This coding procedure allows us to assess the extent to which different categories of 
groups mobilize in response to financial regulatory proposals. Our results, illustrated in Figure , 
suggest that while regulated financial industries are the largest group of actors mobilizing, more 
than half of the groups mobilizing are not, as they include other financial sector groups and also 
business groups outside of the financial industry.  
                                                     
11
 In this table we have calibrated each of the existing studies based on the percentage reported of raw scores. 
This means that, since some studies included public actors, while others did not, for example. In such an 
instance we excluded public actors from the sample to ensure comparability.  
12
 We counted cross-sectoral business associations as representing voices within the business community at 
large, unless they were primarily financial sector associations, in which case we counted these as within the 
financial sector. 
 13 
 
Figure : Distribution of Groups that Respond to Financial Regulatory Consultations 
 
 
While these results support the notion that the financial regulatory policymaking is 
characterized by a greater heterogeneity of groups than many studies acknowledge, is this evidence 
of interest group pluralism in the design of financial regulatory policies? No. To assess such a 
question, we also need to explore what the preferences of respondents are. This is essential in the 
sense that the notion of pluralism is predicated not just on there being a diversity of interest groups 
mobilizing, but also that these groups countervail one another and in particular that they 
countervail the preferences of the dominant group – in this case the regulated financial industry.  In 
order to assess the preferences of the different groups who mobilized we first generated a random 
sample of 108 different policy consultations from our data from the US, EU and transnational 
consultations in our sample.
13
 We then generated a stratified random sample from within each of 
these consultations – generating a draw of up to 4 respondents per interest group category. 
Following Yackee and Yackee (2006, p. 133), we deployed a three-point scale to assess what kind of 
position each comment letter advocated with respect to the level of regulation proposed in the final 
rule. Specifically for each letter we asked whether or not a comment letter was advocating ‘more 
stringency’ in the proposed regulation, agreed with the level of stringency being proposed, or 
wanted ‘less stringency’ in the proposed regulation. While we recognize that this measure is very 
                                                     
13
 This sample is restricted because we didn’t have sufficient variation country consultations in other 
countries across other covariates such as pre-post crisis 
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basic, it fits our research objectives given the need for a standardized metric to assess what is 
admittedly a wide diversity of different kinds of regulatory policies.
14
 We followed a number of 
procedures to enhance the reliability of our data. Specifically, we randomized the order by which 
lobbying letters appeared in the text, to reduce any unintentional ‘anchoring effects’ in the coding 
process;
15
 we included a fourth coding category ‘not possible to identify’ so that none of the coding 
was forced into any one of our three categories; and we ran several inter-coder reliability tests 
throughout this process.  
Our sampling and coding procedure yielded 1391 comment letters in total. 16% of these 
letters were not possible to classify into the three preference categories. Figure  provides a 
representation of the distribution of preferences of different categories of groups, with values 
closer to one meaning that sampled groups in a consultation wanted more stringency, and values 
closer to negative one meaning that they wanted less stringent regulation. 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of Preferences across Groups 
 
 
The results of this analysis show that the financial groups targeted for regulation are the 
groups most likely to advocate for less stringency in a given regulatory proposal they are mobilizing 
over, while other business groups within and outside the financial industry frequently share similar 
positions. Our findings have face validity and conform to many existing qualitative studies that 
                                                     
14
 We also recognize that this 3-point scale is limited in its ability to account for the ‘intensity’ of preferences. 
However we saw a larger symmetrical scale (e.g. 5-point or 7-point) as problematic in that it could generate 
more potential error than meaningful information, especially because interest groups tend to vary in the way 
they express their preferences. 
15
 The randomization of the order by which lobbying letters appeared in the text was introduced only after 
the beginning of our coding, however. 
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describe labor unions, NGOs and consumer groups as groups which mobilize in opposition to the 
interest of the financial industry (Scholte, 2013; Clapp & Helleiner, 2012; Kastner, 2014).   
In order to further probe the level of interest group pluralism in financial regulatory 
politics we have combined our two measures of mobilization and expressed preferences to develop 
a single measure of ‘mobilized dissent’ that express the extent the regulated financial industry is 
facing countervailing voices in the policymaking process.
16
 In order to account for the relational 
character underpinning the concept of interest group plurality we calculated every pairwise 
relationship between all sampled regulated financial industry actors with all other groups sampled in 
each regulatory consultation.
17
 This allows us to produce a measure of preference divergence from 
the regulated financial industry, for each group category in our analysis. This measure can be 
combined with the extent of a group’s mobilization to generate a single score of how much 
‘dissent’ the regulated financial industry faces in a given consultation from a given group.  Our 
measure of ‘mobilized dissent’ is calibrated based on the Euclidian distance from a hypothetical 
situation of maximum interest group plurality, whereby a group outside the regulated financial 
industry is completely dominating the consultation and has completely divergent preferences from 
the regulated industry. Our calculation also recognizes that slight divergence in preferences is not as 
meaningful as wide divergence in preferences. 
Figure 3 below illustrates different qualities of the distribution of ‘mobilized dissent’ across 
the different categories of groups. The boxplot shows the distribution of mobilized dissent across 
different categories of groups, which emphasizes the variation across the range of consultations 
within our data. The pie chart shows the breakdown of which groups are contributing to mobilized 
dissent.  
 
Figure 3: Boxplot and Pie Representation of Mobilized Dissent by Category of Interest 
Group 
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 This assumes that a necessary condition for interest group pluralism is that for interest groups to ‘count’ as 
contributing to pluralism they first have to make their voices heard in the institutionalized framework of a 
regulatory consultation. It makes no assumptions whatsoever regarding whether or not these interest groups 
are ‘heard’ or whether their presence or action lead to changes in the regulatory outcome. 
17
 Our grateful thanks to Matt Denny for sharing their R code which made this process easier. 
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These findings reveal that while civil society groups like NGOs, consumer protection 
groups and research organizations largely mobilize in opposition to the regulated financial industry, 
the extent to which these groups present a countervailing force to the financial industry targeted for 
regulation is constrained by their relatively limited mobilization. As a result almost half of the 
mobilized dissent toward the regulated financial industry comes from within the business 
community, not outside it. As a whole, however, the business community is highly solidaristic with 
the regulated financial industry, as shown in Figure 2 above.  
When mobilized dissent emerges from different groups to different extents, it is also the 
case that it never occurs in isolation. With this in mind we assessed how levels of mobilized dissent 
among different groups relate to one another. Do NGOs, non-financial business groups and labour 
unions mobilize dissent in chorus, or at different times? In Figure 4 below we make such an 
assessment through a visualization of Pearson correlation coefficients of the levels of mobilized 
dissent expressed by different kinds of interest groups. By plotting the correlation of mobilized 
dissent between groups as a series of ties between these groups, we can visualize a network of 
relations of mobilized dissent. The thickness of ties between groups is greater if there is a stronger 
correlation of mobilized dissent between two groups. Green ties indicate that the correlation 
between groups’ mobilized dissent is positive, while red ties indicate a negative correlation. The size 
of the nodes for each category of group is adjusted to indicate the mean level of mobilized dissent 
coming from that group across our sample. 
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Figure 4: Correlation Network of Mobilized Dissent Across Different Groups 
 
What this simple visualization illustrates is that the relationships between different interest groups’ 
levels of mobilized dissent vary in important ways. Mobilized dissent is more correlated across 
some groups and not others. For example non-business groups such as consumer protection 
groups, NGOs, unions, and research groups will tend to mobilize dissent more in tandem with one 
another than in concert with business groups. The mobilized dissent from non-financial businesses 
groups is more strongly correlated with the mobilization of the rest of the financial sector and 
research groups than trade unions and consumer protection groups (see also Young and Pagliari 
2015). Additionally, some groups’ level of mobilized dissent are negatively correlated with one 
another: in particular between civil society groups and the rest of the financial sector. Substantively, 
this means that while business and civil society groups can both contribute significantly to opposing 
the policy preferences of the regulated financial industry, they are not likely to express mobilized 
dissent at the same time but rather are more likely to act in a disjointed manner relative to one 
another. 
Overall, the analysis of the patterns of interest groups mobilization and preferences in this 
section has revealed a number of trends that contribute to the limited interest group plurality in 
finance, such as the limited mobilization of dissenting voices outsides of the business community, 
the largely solidaristic position other groups within the business community, and the fact that these 
sources of opposition to the financial industry tend to be disjointed.  In the section below we dig 
deeper into exploring these patterns by investigating which factors in the regulatory environment 
contribute to, or inhibit, interest group plurality in financial regulatory policymaking. 
 
 18 
Section 3 – What Shapes the Interest Ecology of Finance?  
As one great ecologist pointed out, mean tendencies can be misleading in that they can 
omit important variation within a population (Gould, 1996). The boxplot in Figure 3 above reveals 
how the amount of opposition that the financial industry targeted for regulation will face from 
different groups actually varies significantly. In this section we empirically test how different 
environmental conditions proposed by the literature in Section 2 shape interest group plurality. 
Table 2 below describes the different environmental conditions specified by this literature as 
empirical hypotheses. 
 
Table 2: Hypotheses on Which Environmental Conditions Affect Interest Group Plurality 
Key 
Variable 
Hypothesis Derived From 
Financial Governance 
Literature 
Key authors Variables Expected effect 
on interest 
group plurality  
Salience 
H1: Interest group plurality increases 
with increases in issue salience. 
 
Culpepper 2010 
SALIENCE 
POST-CRISIS 
+ 
Governance 
Level of 
Regulatory 
Policymaking 
H2: International regulatory 
policymaking will be associated with 
less interest group plurality than 
national regulatory policymaking. 
 
Baker 2010; 
Kahler and Lake 
2003 
TRANSNATIONAL - 
Stage in the 
Policymaking 
process 
H3: The earlier in the policymaking 
process, the less interest group 
plurality. 
 
Lall 2012; Mattli 
and Woods 2009 
POLICY CYCLE STAGE 
 
 
+ 
Complexity 
H4: The more complex the financial 
regulation, the lower the level of 
interest group plurality. 
 
Gormley 1986; 
Helleiner and 
Porter 2009; Lall 
2015; McPhilemy 
2013 
TECHNICAL COMPLEXITY 
 
- 
 
 
In order to assess which factors drive interest group pluralism we investigate how these 
different environmental conditions are associated with different levels of mobilized dissent – the 
‘reaction norms’ associated with different conditions. To account for the relative effect of issue 
salience across time and across sectors, we measured levels of average attention given to the 
regulated sector in question within major printed news outlets, for the given year and governance 
context in which a policy consultation took place (L. Epstein & Segal, 2000; for an application to 
the analysis of financial policymaking see Culpepper, 2011; Woll, 2013; Young, 2013).
18
 Using this 
method we generated a variable which measures issue salience in different ways. SALIENCE measures 
the percentage that financial regulation appeared, relative to all news on regulation. One potential 
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 For each sector, for each year of our consultation data, and for each country we selected all English-
language articles published which contained the stem word “regulat*” and the name of the industries that we 
identified as being targeted regulation in the title or the first paragraph. This search was conducted on Factiva 
– an international newspaper and journal database - and it was restricted to news sources identified by Factiva 
as “Major News and Business Publications”.  
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limitation of these measures of issue salience is the fact that salience is not necessarily the product 
of an exogenous shock but may be endogenous to interest group activity itself. Indeed some have 
highlighted how it is common for groups that are disadvantaged by the status quo to engage in 
what Kollman calls “outside lobbying”, that is adopting strategies aimed at mobilizing the public 
and increase the salience of a given issue (Kollman, 1998). In order to address this potential for 
endogeneity we use the financial crisis as a sort of ‘natural experiment’, given the impact of the 
crisis in increasing the salience around financial regulatory policies in all the jurisdictions analyzed in 
this study. The variable POST-CRISIS captures whether or not a consultation response took place after 
September 2008, the month widely regarded as the pivotal date in the financial crisis.  
To assess whether the mobilization of groups varies when the regulatory policymaking 
occurs within transgovernmental institution, we generated a dummy variable, TRANSNATIONAL. This 
variable is coded as 1 when it is a transgovernmental body such as the Basel Committee, the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, or Financial Stability Board is conducting 
the consultation in question, and 0 otherwise.  To test the hypothesis regarding stage in the 
policymaking process, we generated the variable POLICYCYCLESTAGE. To code this variable we 
examined the consultation reference document that interest groups are responding to in each 
instance, and coded it as either an early stage consultation (such as a green paper or a white paper) 
to late-stage policy adjustments of an already implemented policy, such as the ex-post evaluation of 
regulation, or amending an already implemented piece of regulation.  
To measure the level of the technical complexity of different consultations that interest 
groups are responding to, we generated a 9-point scale ranging from very simple regulation to very 
complex, using a coding template to generate the variable TECHNICALCOMPLEXITY. To minimize 
arbitrariness of such a scale we instituted a coding procedure designed to simulate the process by 
which an individual from an interest group might chose to engage with a regulatory policy or not,
19
 
and instituted a series of inter-coder reliability checks.
20
   
Because our dependent variable, mobilized dissent, is calibrated as a proportion (from 
zero, no mobilized dissent, to 1, maximum mobilized dissent), we use a generalized linear model 
                                                     
19
 We limited the viewing time a coder had to view a policy consultation document to 60 seconds and by 
ensuring that each coder was ‘blind’ to the codes of the other.   
20
 Specifically, we used a team of coders, used a standardized coding template, and utilized inter-coder 
reliability checks at each stage of the process, never proceeding unless inter coder agreement was above 70% 
(chance-adjusted) agreement according to a concordance correlation coefficient.  
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with a logit link, as recommended by best practices within the interest groups literature (Papke & 
Wooldridge, 1996; Baum, 2008; Chalmers, 2014). As emphasized above, mobilized dissent is also 
relatively rare, and thus has an inflated number of zeros - as such we specified a negative binomial 
family in these regressions. Each of our models contain dummies for both transnational level 
governance and EU-level governance, leaving the US as the reference category. We also include a 
dummy variable that controls for whether or not a given consultation had an implied ‘audience’ 
restriction, differentiating whether policymakers explicitly invite comments from selected 
stakeholders from within the financial industry (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0) (see Chalmers 2014; 
Quittkat 2011). 
We ran regressions as a way of testing the reaction norms of mobilized dissent for different 
kinds of interest groups under different environmental conditions  – first with total mobilized 
dissent (Model 1) and then with mobilized dissent broken down for each actor-category (Models 2-
7). Our main results are reported in Table 3 below, with robust standard errors reported. To ensure 
the robustness of our findings, we also measured mobilized dissent as a binary variable (i.e. either 
present or absent) and ran simple logit models. The results, reported in the Appendix, yielded the 
same directional results, usually with the same or higher levels of statistical significance. Figure 7 in 
the Appendix reports results from alternative model specifications in which we included our 
continuous measure of salience, which we did not include in the regression analysis below in Table 
3 because it introduces multicollinearity.  
Our results for Model 1 (Table 3) suggest that while coefficient signs are all in the expected 
direction, only technical complexity is statistically significant, thus offering support for the 
hypothesis that the overall level of plurality decreases as the level of technical complexity increases 
(H4).  
 
Table 3: Regressions Predicting Mobilized Dissent 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Total 
Mobilized 
Dissent 
Rest of 
Financial 
Sector 
Non-
Financial 
Business 
Labour 
Unions 
Consumer 
Protection 
Research NGOs 
        
Technical Complexity  0.178***   
(0.0562) 
0.0206   
(0.0706) 
-0.216***   
(0.0727) 
-0.423***   
(0.130) 
-0.255**   
(0.130) 
-0.181*   
(0.0940) 
-0.280**   
(0.127) 
        
Post Financial Crisis 0.312   
(0.204) 
-0.110   
(0.286) 
0.0304 
  (0.260) 
2.716***   
(0.815) 
0.576   
(0.734) 
0.698**   
(0.350) 
1.496***   
(0.533) 
 
        
Late Stage Policymaking 0.189   
(0.178 
0.351   
(0.243) 
0.0186   
(0.277) 
-0.330   
(0.479) 
-0.491   
(0.639) 
0.362   
(0.329) 
0.601   
(0.495) 
        
Restricted Audience -0.0400   -0.0691   -0.122   0.663   1.095**   0.338   0.429 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(0.241) (0.311) (0.357) (0.438) 
 
(0.536) (0.484) (0.509) 
        
Transnational Consultation -0.0819   
(0.237) 
0.702*   
(0.361) 
-0.604   
(0.430) 
 
-15.20***   
(0.711) 
-15.05***   
(0.749) 
0.261   
(0.570) 
-0.911   
(0.807) 
        
EU Consultation -0.106   
(0.249) 
0.350   
(0.340) 
-0.462   
(0.330) 
-0.356   
(0.649) 
-0.186   
(0.650) 
0.0617   
(0.419) 
-0.856*   
(0.512) 
        
Constant -0.538   
(0.512) 
-2.707***   
(0.661) 
-0.341   
(0.654) 
-1.854   
(1.435) 
-1.569   
(1.345) 
-1.912**   
(0.848) 
-1.337   
(1.077) 
Observations 104 103 100 100 100 92 102 
            Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
Figure  below plots the predicted change in mobilized dissent as the technical complexity 
of financial regulation increases, for different categories of actors. These results show the consistent 
pattern across all categories of interest groups outside of financial sector groups not targeted for 
regulation (we report the results for binary logit models in the Figure 8 in the Appendix). This 
result suggests that financial industry groups are not inhibited to take countervailing positions on 
highly technical regulatory proposals, likely because they have greater technical expertise than other 
groups. This finding offers quantitative support to qualitative research that has suggested that 
technical complexity plays a role in limiting the capacity of non-financial groups to act as 
countervailing forces to the financial industry. 
 
Figure 5: Effect of Technical Complexity over the dissent faced by the regulated financial industry 
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While other environmental conditions are not significantly associated with changes in the 
overall level of mobilized dissent faced by the regulated financial industry, this does not mean that 
they not affect the diversity of voices in the regulatory process. An important finding of this 
analysis is that in general different kinds of interest groups react differently. Looking at the impact 
of the governance level in which financial regulatory policymaking occurs, financial regulatory 
policy developed at the transnational level predicts significantly less mobilized dissent among 
unions and consumer protection groups. Other financial industry groups beyond the financial 
industry targeted for regulation were less inhibited. This finding offers conditional support for H2 and 
thus supports notions within extant literature that transnational governance significantly reduces 
interest group plurality.  
 Our results for salience effects are more complex, since we find support for pre- post-crisis 
changes but no statistically significant results for our continuous measure of media salience. 
Similarly to the impact of technical complexity and the governance level, our results for the impact 
of the financial crisis vary considerably across different groups. Figure 6 below shows the norms of 
reaction to the financial crisis across different groups by plotting the predicted means and 
associated 95% confidence intervals. The ‘demonstration effect’ of the financial crisis of 2008 has 
positively affected the level of mobilized dissent generated by both NGOs and labour unions, and 
while other non-business groups such as consumer protection and research groups have also 
stepped up their mobilized dissent the effect is not significantly different within a 95% confidence 
interval. 
 
Figure 6: Pre/Post-Crisis Norms of Reaction for Different Kinds of Interest Groups 
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Finally, the notion that interest group plurality is conditional on the ‘stage’ of policymaking 
(H3) does not seem to be borne out by our evidence. Policymaking stage was found to be non-
significant for each category of actor, with high standard errors in each instance. This non-effect 
persists whether or not we code policy stage as a binary variable (contrasting ‘early’ with ‘late’ –
stage policymaking) or as a 1-5 scale. We should stress that these results do not provide exhaustive 
evidence against H3, since the policy consultations from which we gathered data is likely to be past 
the very earliest agenda-setting stage of policymaking during which the first mover advantage of the 
financial industry is more likely to be significant. Our overall findings suggest a complex picture: 
while factors like technical complexity of regulation inhibit mobilized dissent in general, other 
factors affect the extent of mobilized dissent coming from some groups and not others.    
  
Conclusion  
While numerous studies have focused on the role of the financial industry and have 
highlighted the manifold power resources of the financial industry as an interest group, the financial 
industry does not operate in a vacuum. Our analysis has contributed to the literature on the political 
economy of financial regulation by exploring the ecology of interest groups that populate the 
financial regulatory policymaking space, with a particular focus on understanding the extent of 
interest group plurality. To be sure, there are many different dimensions to financial industry 
power; yet as we outlined above, interest group plurality is frequently assumed to be a vital 
component to many political economy analyses. Through an analysis of extensive new data from 
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regulatory policy consultations in the United States, the European Union and at the transnational 
level of policymaking, this paper has mapped the extent to which financial industry groups targeted 
for regulation face the mobilization of dissenting voices in the financial regulatory policymaking 
process and the conditions under which this varies. A variety of major findings emerge from our 
empirical analysis, each with implications for the literature on the political economy of financial 
regulation. 
Our analysis reveals that while non-business civil society groups largely mobilize in 
opposition to the financial industry, their role as a countervailing force to the financial industry 
targeted for regulation is constrained by their limited mobilization. This finding provides  empirical 
support to a wide variety of literature in recent years which has emphasized the striking absence of 
civil society voices in financial regualtory policymaking (Scholte, 2013; Helleiner & Porter, 2010; 
Mügge, 2010, p. 9; Mooslechner et al., 2006). This limited mobilization of civil society groups has 
important and unexpected consequences on where existing interest group pluralism actually ends 
up coming from. The business community outside the regulated financial industry has a complex 
role in contributing to interest group plurality as we have measured it. Our analysis empirically 
confirms the widely-held notion that financial regulatory policymaking is dominated by business 
groups.  Yet their role is not simple. One the one hand, because they mobilize so much in 
comparison with civil society groups, business groups contribute significantly more to interest 
group plurality than do civil society organizations. At the same time, the vast majority of business 
mobilization around financial regulation is solidaristic: business expresses preferences which are 
closely aligned with those of the financial industry targeted for regulation.  
We also found that when mobilized dissent emerges, it emerges in a disjointed way among 
groups. The circumstances when NGOs act as a countervailing voice to the financial industry, for 
example, are not the same circumstances as when non-financial businesses do, and trade unions 
mobilize dissent at different times as do consumer protection and research groups. Thus while 
there are some important moments of greater interest group pluralism, dissenting voices from the 
financial industry targeted for regulation rarely mobilize together in sync. Thus while interest group 
pluralism within financial regulation is highly variable, and not static, it rarely if ever cascades into a 
large oppositional force. This is a striking finding, since it suggests that with a disjointed opposition 
financial industry groups can enjoy a situation of not only numerous power resources and 
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institutional conditions keyed to their advantage, but also face very little by way of mobilized 
opposition. Overall, our analysis thus provides empirical support to those studies which have 
identified in the limited presence of “countervailing forces” as a key element reinforcing the policy 
influence of financial industry groups (Anheier, 2014)..  
Dissenting voices to the regulated financial industry are not only infrequent but also that 
they are highly variable. Through an indicator of ‘mobilized dissent’, we have examined the 
particular sets of conditions under which interest group plurality changes. One of our key findings 
is that the higher technical complexity of financial regulation is associated with lower interest group 
plurality. This finding thus supports the notion within the literature that technical complexity is a 
complementary aspect of financial industry power (McPhilemy, 2013; Lall, 2015; McCarty, 2013). In 
demonstrating the variability of mobilized dissent our findings complement recent interventions on 
the theme of regulatory capture and financial hegemony which suggest that finance has been 
subject to greater challenge since the global financial crisis (Kastner, 2014; Clapp & Helleiner, 2012; 
Pagliari & Young, 2014; Young, 2012; Helleiner & Thistlethwaite, 2013). Our empirical evidence 
suggests that we should expect to find financial regulatory policymaking processes to be less 
dominated by the regulated financial industry when regulation is generated after the global financial 
crisis, is relatively non-complex and is situated away from transnational policymaking fora. This 
finding is concordant with the recent case studies which find evidence of labour unions and civil 
society groups effectively mobilizing as a countervailing group to the regulated financial industry in 
the US and EU in the context of consumer financial protection reforms (Kirsch & Mayer, 2013; 
Kastner, 2014). Yet technical complexity has by no means abated since the crisis. Neither has the 
extent of financial regulatory policymaking taking place at the transnational level. In other words, 
while there are interest group environments that lead to greater interest group pluralism, these 
environments are relatively rare.   
While certain environmental conditions in the regulatory environment will increase the 
degree of dissent faced by the regulated financial industry, this reaction will vary significantly across 
different interest groups types. The effect of the financial crisis has increased mobilized dissent 
emerging from unions and NGOs, for example; however this effect does not exist for other 
categories of groups, such as non-financial business groups, research groups and consumer 
protection groups. The migration of regulatory policies to the transnational level hinders the 
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mobilized dissent of unions and consumer protection groups, but does not inhibit the mobilization 
of financial industry groups outside the financial industry targeted for regulation. 
Overall, the fact that the environmental conditions under which the financial industry is 
more likely to be challenged do not co-occur with great frequency and trigger differential responses 
from different groups can be interpreted as a factor contributing to the significant clout that the 
financial industry has exercised both before and after the financial crisis. The disjointedness of 
interest group responses to financial regulatory policymaking processes is not simply just about a 
lack of coordination but rather relates to the fact that they have different ‘norms of reaction’ to 
different environmental conditions.  
Further research is needed to provide a more complete explanation of the characteristics of 
the interest ecology of finance detailed in this contribution, and to understand what factors 
contribute to the variations in the level of mobilized dissent faced by the financial industry revealed 
in this paper.  Providing a full explanation of the origins of the different “norms of reaction” that 
different types of stakeholders have to the changes in the policymaking environment would require 
an investigation of both group-level characteristics, such as the different organizational, financial, 
and informational resources that different groups can mobilize, as well as relational factors such the 
linkages between different groups. While this analysis remains outside the scope of this paper, 
further research is needed to better understand what factors influence the capacity of different 
groups to overcome the different environmental constraints limiting plurality in financial regulation 
discussed here.  Moreover, further research is also needed to explore additional environmental 
conditions which may influence the level of mobilized dissent faced by the financial industry but 
which the nature of data did not allow us to investigate – such as the variations within countries 
between independent regulatory agencies and more directly more politically-controlled venues 
(McKay, 2010; Rasmussen & Carroll, 2013) and across countries characterized by different 
structures of the financial system (Hall & Soskice, 2001; cf. Hardie, Howarth, Maxfield, & Verdun, 
2013). 
Finally, while our analysis has investigated how the degree of mobilized dissent faced by 
financial industry varies across particular environmental conditions, further research is needed to 
understand how our findings relate to the broader socio-economic context and the changes in the 
role of finance in contemporary capitalist economies. We note how our findings are complementary 
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with those of recent contributions to the analysis of “financialization” (G. Epstein & Jayadev, 2005; 
van der Zwan, 2014). In particular, Callaghan suggests that the greater financialization of the 
economy generates growing acquiescence by expanding the range of groups with a stake in the 
continuation of these rules that favour the financial industry, while making it more difficult for 
challengers to draw attention to the issue (Callaghan, 2015). Indeed, a variety of studies have 
suggested that the non-financial firms are increasingly behaving like financial firms by generating a 
greater share of their profits through financial channels than productive activities (Krippner, 2005) 
or engaging in the provision of financial services (Baud & Durand, 2012), in what the literature has 
called the ‘financialization of non-financial corporates’ (Tomaskovic-Devey, Lin, & Meyers, 2015; 
van der Zwan, 2014). Along the same lines, other studies have suggested that pro-finance industry 
orientations have been positively affected by the fact that households across the socio-economic 
distribution in the US and other jurisdictions have become increasingly integrated into the financial 
economy through the access to a greater range of financial products such as mortgages, mutual 
funds, student loans, private pensions (Fligstein & Goldstein, 2015; Langley, 2008). Future 
scholarship should investigate to what extent the transformations in the structure of contemporary 
capitalist economies and the so-called process of financialization of the economy can also account 
for the limited dissent faced by the financial industry in financial regulatory policymaking.   
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Appendix I: Description of the Data 
 
Table 5 - Institutions Coded in Our Dataset 
 
Name of the Institution Country 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision International 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission US 
Comptroller of the Currency  US 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau  US 
Department of Housing and Urban Development US 
European Commission  EU 
European Banking Authority EU 
European Securities Markets Authority EU 
Federal Reserve Board US 
Financial Stability Board International 
Financial Stability Oversight Council US 
International Organization of Securities Commissions International 
Office of Thrift Supervision  US 
Securities and Exchange Commission US 
Small Business Administration US 
 
 
 34 
  
 
Figure 6 - Financial Industries Being Targeted for Regulation 
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Figure 7: Effect of Salience on Mobilized Dissent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Logit Replication of Main Regression Reported in Paper 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Total 
Mobilized 
Dissent 
Rest of 
Financial 
Sector 
Non-
Financial 
Business 
Labour 
Unions 
Consumer 
Protection 
Research NGOs 
        
Technical Complexity      -0.424**     
    (0.170)    
-0.0240 
(0.130)    
-0.316** 
(0.137)    
-0.603*** 
(0.214)    
-0.468** 
(0.184)    
-0.169 
(0.136)    
-0.603*** 
(0.214)    
        
Post Financial Crisis 0.848* 
(0.460)    
0.0941 
(0.451)    
0.0102 
(0.426)    
3.394*** 
(1.167)    
0.912 
(0.712)    
1.153** 
(0.461)    
3.394*** 
(1.167)    
        
Late Stage Policymaking -0.417 
(0.481)    
-0.0971 
(0.450)    
-0.304 
(0.451)    
0.138 
(0.691)    
-0.190 
(0.712)    
0.388 
(0.504)    
0.138 
(0.691)    
        
Restricted Audience -0.511 
(0.695)    
0.155 
(0.660)    
-0.464 
(0.637)    
1.534* 
(0.876)    
1.587** 
(0.741)    
-0.0193 
(0.597)    
1.534* 
(0.876)    
        
Transnational Consultation 0.596 
(0.677)    
1.681** 
(0.677)    
-0.113 
(0.661)      
0.625 
(0.710)     
        
EU Consultation 0.198 
(0.621)    
0.622 
(0.566)    
-0.0685 
(0.568)    
-0.160 
(0.851)    
-0.0948 
(0.728)    
0.295 
(0.579)    
-0.160 
(0.851)    
        
Constant 3.423** 
(1.508)    
-0.791 
(1.198)    
2.384* 
(1.276)    
0.582 
(2.065)    
1.402 
(1.687)    
-0.253 
(1.217)    
0.582 
(2.065)    
Observations 104    104    104    88    88    104    88    
            Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 8: Effect of Technical Complexity over the dissent faced by the regulated financial industry, 
using binary version of mobilized dissent 
 
 
 
 
